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This Policy Paper is the first in a series that will be produced by the Jean Monnet Multilateral 
Research Network on ‘The Diplomatic System of the European Union’. The network is 
centred on three partner institutions: Loughborough University (UK), Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven (BE) and Maastricht University (NL). It also brings together colleagues from a wide 
range of academic institutions within the EU, and includes participants from EU institutions 
and non-governmental organisations. The aim of the Policy Papers series is to contribute to 
current debates about the emerging EU system of diplomacy and to identify the key 
challenges to which the EU’s diplomatic system will need to respond in the short and 
medium term. 
 
This Paper reflects discussions at the initial conference of the network, in December 2009, 
and developments in the wider debates during early 2010. 
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The Emerging EU System of Diplomacy: How Fit for Purpose? 
 
Overview: The Problems of An EU System of Diplomacy 
 
The ratification and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty has created the framework for 
development of a wide-ranging system of EU diplomacy. This system is not being created on 
an institutional tabula rasa – nor is it being created in an international vacuum. A key issue to 
address is therefore the extent to which the system will be ‘fit for purpose’, in two senses: 
 
 First, will the EU’s system of diplomacy provide the EU with the ‘equipment’ to 
exercise a coherent diplomatic influence in the world arena? 
 Second, will this system enable the EU to meet the key challenges of life within the 
world arena in the 2010s? 
 
In relation to the first of these questions, it can be observed that the EU’s emergence as a 
significant diplomatic actor is not sudden or unexpected – it is the result of processes that 
have taken place over the past four decades, and not unexpectedly, it reflects bargains and 
compromises made during that extended gestation. It will also reflect further such bargains 
and compromises among institutions and Member States as the implications of the Lisbon 
Treaty unfold. Thus this paper assumes that the provision of diplomatic ‘equipment’ for the 
EU is a political and social process rather than just a mechanical implementation of agreed 
institutional changes. 
 
In relation to the second question, it is clear that the consolidation of the EU’s diplomatic 
system will take place in a changing system of world diplomacy, and that one of the key tests 
of the EU’s new life as a diplomatic actor will be the effectiveness with which it responds to 
the new constellations and the new challenges and opportunities of international life in the 
developing 21st century. This paper identifies two central and interrelated challenges for the 
EU in this context: those of strategic diplomacy and structural diplomacy. Crucially, these 
‘external’ challenges intersect with the ‘internal’ process of the development of the EU’s 
system of diplomacy. 
 
The crux of the argument in the paper is that at present (in March 2010), the debate about 
the EU’s system of diplomacy is missing key questions in both of the areas identified above. 
First, it is by-passing the question of ‘fitness for purpose’ in institutional terms, and second, it 
is neglecting the issues of external ‘fitness for purpose’ arising from the challenges of 
strategic and structural diplomacy. We hope the paper will help to focus attention on what we 
see as crucial issues in the development of an EU diplomacy. 
 
 
The Challenge of Twenty-First Century Diplomacy 
 
As noted above, the EU’s system of diplomacy is not emerging into a historical or 
international vacuum. A number of significant trends in twenty-first century diplomacy 
demand consideration in any evaluation of what is happening within the EU: 
 
 First, the participants in diplomatic processes have become much more diverse and 
difficult to manage. The days when diplomacy could be conducted within the confines 
of a cross-national diplomatic elite have very largely gone. What has taken the place 
of that elite could be described as a process of multi-stakeholder diplomacy, within 
which a variety of participants with a variety of interests and of characteristic 
behaviours manoeuvre for influence. 
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 As a result of this change in patterns of participation, the roles of national diplomatic 
services have increasingly been challenged. States have responded actively to the 
new situation, and have created new structures with which to manage the 
increasingly complex environment within which they have to pursue their interests; 
but the capacity of the state to retain its central if not dominant position (and of 
specific states to retain their positions) is open to question. 
 
 There has been an increasing focus – both in the study and in the practice of 
diplomacy – on the growth of diplomatic networks and of structures of global 
governance, within which the diverse participants in world politics can communicate 
with the aim of managing complex global issues. Traditional diplomatic processes of 
negotiation and the exchange of information can still be identified, but they are 
implanted in a radically different context. Arguably, this is the case even in the most 
traditionally sacrosanct domains of international relations, those dealing with security 
and military affairs. 
 
 Attention thus needs to be paid to the ways in which diplomacy reflects the demand 
for management of complexity and difference within a changing world arena, and the 
ways in which learning occurs within diplomatic contexts and between diplomatic 
participants. Diplomacy in this sense is seen as a process of deliberation rather than 
a reflection of ‘power realities’, although those realities are by no means absent – 
indeed, the danger is that an over-emphasis on the power of deliberation can be 
overtaken by the impact of events and challenges reflecting the exercise of power or 
coercion. 
 
 Finally, the role and identity of the diplomat has been challenged by the 
developments outlined above. It can no longer be safely assumed that a diplomat is a 
member of a national diplomatic service and nothing more. At the most basic level, a 
member of a diplomatic service can simultaneously be a member of several (or many) 
diplomatic networks involving a range of institutional frameworks and of ‘diplomatic 
cultures’. There is thus a strong incentive to think in terms of problems of role 
definition, role performance and role evaluation when thinking about diplomats – not 
only in analytical terms, but in terms of the ways in which diplomats do their job on a 
day to day basis. 
 
For the emerging diplomatic system of the EU, there are many implications of these changes 
in the form and status of diplomacy in general. On the face of it, the formalisation and 
consolidation of a system of diplomacy centred on the Union might seem to be a clear and 
appropriate response to many if not all of the issues we have identified – the ‘hour of Europe’ 
in terms of diplomacy may have arrived. But that leaves aside the challenges faced by the 
EU, not only in terms of its institutions but also in terms of the external challenges they might 
face. We turn first to the challenge of institutions. 
 
 
The Institutional Challenge 
 
A central concern in the establishment of an EU diplomatic system is the underpinning 
institutional architecture. Institutions structure the interactions between different players and 
give permanency to the process of dialogue amongst the member states and between the 
EU and third countries. Institutional bargains and the impact of developments in the wider 
international arena have for a long time structured the EU’s system of diplomacy in a process 
of incremental development, reflecting the competition between Brussels-based institutions 
and Member States for influence, and focusing the search for consistency and coherence in 
the EU’s developing international roles. 
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The Lisbon Treaty represents the most recent and possibly most daring step in this long 
process of institutionalisation. In an attempt to address the long-standing lack of continuity, 
coherence and leadership in European foreign policy, the Treaty has created the new 
position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). 
This double-hatted chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and Vice President of the European 
Commission will replace the rotating Council Presidency and should fulfil a bridging function 
with the European Commission. The new European External Action (EEAS) supporting the 
HR in her daily work will for the first time bring together officials from the European 
Commission, the Council General Secretariat and the diplomatic services of the member 
states. For information and implementation on the ground, the Treaty envisages that the HR 
will be able to rely on the upgraded EU delegations. Last but not least the new President of 
the European Council will represent the Union in external affairs at the level of the heads of 
state and government. 
 
Whether Lisbon represents a critical juncture and fulfils the many expectations remains to be 
seen. The new bodies will not be set up in one day and much will depend on how the 
different players will eventually resolve the following questions: 
 
 Working out what the creation of the new positions of the non-rotating President of 
the European Council and the High Representative will mean for the institutional 
balance and the nature of EU foreign policy. Will the nomination of the double-hatted 
HR open the way for a more supranational approach or will it on the contrary 
introduce elements of intergovernmentalism in communitarised areas such as trade 
and development? How will the position of the President of the European Council 
impact on those of the President of the European Commission and the High 
Representative?   
 
 The abolition of the rotating Presidency in CFSP was supposed to make it more easy 
for Europe to speak with one voice. The confusion created by the first EU summit in 
Madrid (February 2010) illustrates that this may not necessarily be the case. Rather 
than reducing the number of players, the number of phone numbers to be dialled 
seems further to have increased. For certain heads of state or government it will be 
extremely hard to accept that during their period at the helm it will be the President of 
the European Council and the HR who are responsible for the external presentation 
of the Union. 
 
 An important piece of the new institutional puzzle is the European External Action 
Service. Decisions about its composition and scope of activities, its financing, staff 
recruitment and the principles of rotation of personnel, will be key factors in the 
further development of a credible European foreign policy. Emerging evidence in 
early 2010 seems to indicate that the EEAS is becoming a stake in a political struggle 
between the Commission and the Council of the EU, with the Parliament also 
involved, rather than a means of integrating the different ‘communities’ on which the 
EU’s system of diplomacy has to be based. 
 
 Equally important are the terms in which the debate over the EU’s system of 
diplomacy will be conducted. How will the member states and the EU institutions 
address the challenges related to the creation of the new bodies? Will they primarily 
be led by national or institutional considerations of power and influence or will they be 
able to define the new institutions on the basis of relatively objective criteria related to 
quality and efficiency? In other words will the tone be dominated by debates about 
geographical and institutional balances or by what is needed for an effective foreign 
policy? 
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 A further issue is that of coherence. How will the new bodies affect the coordination of 
EU external action? To what extent will the HR and the EEAS manage to coordinate 
the various instruments ranging across (for example) trade, development, human 
rights and crisis management? The creation of single geographical and thematic 
desks in the EEAS is a step in the right direction, but since the Commission will 
continue to be in charge of the financing and implementation of projects, it will be 
important to ensure that the old inter-institutional rivalries are not replaced by new 
ones.    
 
 An important element in the evolution of the institutional context will be its impact on 
the practice of national diplomatic services. Will it lead to a re-allocation of resources 
from the national to the European level? Will the member states be willing to send 
their best people to Brussels? Are they willing to invest in a joint training programme 
aimed at the development of a shared diplomatic culture? How will the national 
embassies in third countries relate to the Union delegations? What will be the division 
of tasks? 
 
The responses may differ from country to country. While some of the smaller member states 
may consider the emerging EU diplomatic service as a chance to reduce costs and alleviate 
their own over-stretched services, big member states may see it as a competitor and try to 
keep it as weak as possible. At the same time, the position of the HR in a Union of twenty-
seven Member States and at least three Presidencies might become hostage to the interests 
of specific groups; and there is already evidence that this is what is happening. In all of this, it 
is easy to forget that the intention behind the creation of an EU system of diplomacy is to 
enable the EU to respond more effectively to key international challenges. To these we now 
turn. 
 
 
The Challenge of Strategic Diplomacy 
 
During the past three decades, but especially since the end of the Cold War, the EU has 
engaged in a consistent search for strategic partners and strategic partnerships; it has also 
actively identified strategic issues in which it should develop its role and if possible exercise 
leadership. Indeed, this area of activity has marked the EU out from many other international 
actors, including leading states. The Union, it has seemed at times, has a strategy for almost 
everything, and for almost everyone in the world arena. It might therefore seem natural for 
the conduct of strategic diplomacy to be at the core of the EU’s emerging system of 
diplomacy. However, on closer examination, a number of questions can be identified, about 
the nature of the EU’s strategic ambitions, about the ways in which they might be served by a 
consolidated diplomatic machine, and perhaps most importantly about the extent to which 
the current debate makes any reference to such strategic considerations. These questions 
include the following: 
 
 First, the extent to which the EU might be considered as a strategic actor. Such 
‘actorness’ implies a number of characteristics: the ability consistently to extract 
resources from Member States; a conscious link between extraction of resources and 
a ‘grand strategy’ embodying long term aims; the capacity to develop and sustain a 
consistent strategic narrative embodying a consensus among institutions and 
Member States; and an ability to identify, adapt to and influence key changes in the 
world arena. Implicitly or explicitly, these considerations have been present in the 
development of ‘European foreign policy’ since the 1970s – but to what extent have 
they been resolved, and in what ways might an EU system of diplomacy like that 
emerging from the Lisbon Treaty enable the key issues to be pursued and achieved? 
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 Next, the underlying rationale of strategic diplomacy. We can identify (at least) three 
key rationales for the active development and pursuit of an EU strategic diplomacy. 
The first is integrative: in other words, strategic diplomacy is a means by which the 
EU pursues its own integration, providing a rationale for EU international activity and 
contributing to the more effective realisation of that nebulous entity, a ‘European 
identity’. The second is positional: here, strategic diplomacy is pursued as a means of 
positioning the EU in the world arena and of making it an unavoidable interlocutor in 
the management of key international issues. This function of strategic diplomacy has 
a key linkage to the legitimacy of the EU’s international role(s). The final rationale for 
strategic diplomacy is relational: here, it is a means of managing relationships with 
key partners or in key issue areas which are of importance to the international life of 
the Union. In this context, strategic diplomacy can take the form of containment of key 
threats or of promotion of key partnerships or institutional affiliations. When these 
rationales are linked to the emergence of the EU’s system of diplomacy, the question 
yet again arises of ‘fitness for purpose’. If these are the reasons why the EU has and 
does pursue strategic diplomacy, to what extent is the institutional framework and the 
political context in the EU conducive to their successful pursuit? 
 
 Third, the content of strategic diplomacy. The EU’s pursuit of strategic diplomacy has 
taken a number of forms; whilst each of them reflects the underlying rationales 
outlined above, each of them also has distinctive implications which demand 
management and at times reconciliation in the conduct of EU activities. A roll-call of 
areas in which the EU has enunciated and pursued strategic ambitions would include: 
accession diplomacy; neighbourhood diplomacy; inter-regional diplomacy; and 
partnership diplomacy, especially towards emerging powers such as the BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) countries. At the global level, we can also identify a number 
of issues areas in which the EU has pursued strategic diplomacy as defined above: 
environment, human rights, non-proliferation and others. There are important 
variations and differences not only between these categories but also within them; 
and this brings us back to a point made earlier about diplomacy as the management 
of difference and complexity. From the perspective of this paper, the key question 
that arises is whether the EU’s system of diplomacy will muster the capacity to 
manage this diverse content and make the appropriate choices of forum and process 
with which to pursue them.  
 
Where does the debate stand in relation to the ways in which the EU’s system of diplomacy 
might contribute to the enhancement of strategic diplomacy? In our view, the key questions 
outlined above have hardly been touched upon in the debate so far. The EU continues to 
have a plethora of strategies but no strategy, and there is no evidence that the debate has 
focused on the ways in which this might be addressed. The rationales for strategic diplomacy 
have likewise not been consistently addressed or discussed within the debate so far. As 
implied above, the integrative, positional and relational aspects of strategic diplomacy require 
constant attention if they are to be effectively pursued, and the inevitable hiatus caused by 
the contest for influence in Brussels is not to the advantage of any EU initiatives in these 
areas. Perhaps the most important of all the EU’s strategic partnerships is that with the USA, 
but the ways in which this has been addressed – and responded to – in early 2010 do not 
give cause for confidence. The content of the EU’s strategic diplomacy remains segmented 
or fragmented, with the different but interlinked forms of strategic initiative continuing to exist 
in different boxes and no evidence of a grand design to overcome the consequent problems 
of coordination and resource allocation.  
 
It might be argued that these ‘absences’ reflect a temporary situation, and that within months 
or weeks they will be addressed and dealt with. We believe that they actually reflect 
underlying problems in the development of EU strategic diplomacy that demand attention, 
and that there is no excuse for delay. Whilst the debate continues in Brussels, or between 
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Brussels and national capitals within the Union, the opportunity for the EU to exert significant 
influence on key strategic developments in the world arena may be disappearing. We thus 
advocate focused and persistent attention to these issues from the very outset of the EU’s 
new system of diplomacy, but we worry that they may get ‘lost’ in the noise of cross-national 
and cross-institutional turf battles. 
 
 
The Challenge of Structural Diplomacy 
 
In the current discussion on the EU’s new diplomacy after Lisbon, there is a tendency to 
neglect one of the dimensions that in the past 20 years have been at the heart of EU 
diplomacy: developing long-term relations with other countries and regions and - as part of 
these relations - promoting values, rules and structures that the EU considers important, 
such as democracy, rule of law, human rights, good governance, free market economy, etc. 
We label this diplomacy as ‘structural diplomacy’, being a process of dialogue and 
negotiation with third countries and other regions aimed at influencing or shaping in a 
sustainable way the political, legal, socio-economic, security and other structures in these 
countries or regions. Such a diplomacy is clearly linked to the aims of strategic diplomacy, 
but is distinct from it in the ways it aims to ‘get under the skin’ of target countries or regions. 
 
Successful examples of ‘structural diplomacy’ are the policies towards the Central and 
Eastern European countries (leading to their EU membership) and, for the time being, also 
the current policy towards the Balkan countries. Less successful or still ongoing examples 
are the European Mediterranean Policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Union for 
the Mediterranean, the Eastern Partnership, the Cotonou Agreement, beside the many 
bilateral partnerships and agreements with third countries. The goal to have a structural 
impact on third countries is also at the heart of the EU’s post-conflict and peace-building 
diplomacy, as exemplified in the EU’s policy towards Kosovo or DRCongo.  
 
In our view, there is a major risk that the EU’s potential to conduct an effective structural 
diplomacy may significantly diminish in the coming years, for the following reasons: 
 
 A first reason is paradoxically related to the new institutional setup foreseen by the 
Lisbon Treaty. The institutional division of labour was quite clear in the pre-Lisbon 
period. The High Representative for the CFSP, Mr. Solana, was in the first place 
responsible for what we can call traditional diplomacy. The Commission, and 
particularly Ms. Ferrero-Waldner as the Commissioner for External Relations, was 
responsible for the long-term relations and partnerships with third countries and other 
regions. In the post-Lisbon period, the new High Representative / Vice-President of 
the Commission, Catherine Ashton, will to a major extent combine both functions. As 
noted above, it remains to be seen what the precise division of labour within the 
Commission will look like. However, there is a major risk that Baroness Ashton – as a 
result of normal time constraints and pressure to focus on the most urgent issues - 
will mainly focus on traditional diplomatic issues, crises and conflicts, and will neglect 
the long-term relations and the structural diplomacy that are central to a ‘European 
foreign policy’.   
 
 A second reason is related to the fact that, with the exception of the Balkan countries, 
the EU’s structural diplomacy is now mainly focused on regions outside the 
immediate European ‘neighbourhood’ (the former Soviet-area, the Mediterranean, 
Africa, Asia) where the EU cannot use the leverage bestowed by the possibility of 
membership. It is thus not possible to rather unilaterally compel these countries to 
adopt the structures that are promoted by the EU. Moreover, the EU is confronted in 
these regions with other structural powers that equally try to promote their structures 
and rules (such as Russia, China and Islamism). This implies that the EU in its 
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structural diplomacy has to demonstrate more convincingly that the structures which it 
promotes are indeed in the interest of the partner countries and that they take into 
account the specific views and contexts of these countries. Finally, as the difference 
between the political, legal, economic and societal contexts in Europe and in these 
regions is quite large, the EU faces the need to adapt the promoted structures to the 
specific national, regional or local contexts within these countries, in order to avoid a 
complete misfit. In short: an effective and relevant structural diplomacy cannot 
consider the export of European structures as a kind of standard operating 
procedure, with these structures being ‘passe-partouts’ that can be applied 
everywhere, always and in all circumstances 
 
In light of the arguments made here, we wish to advance three proposals for the continuing 
safeguarding or enhancement of the EU’s structural diplomacy. First, we propose that in the 
new EU system of diplomacy a number of Adjunct-Commissioners or Special 
Representatives – backed up with real competences and budgets, but under the authority of 
Ms. Ashton – should have the explicit task of taking care of the EU’s long-term relations and 
partnerships with other regions or countries and of the structural diplomacy that is part of it. 
They should be backed up by units in the EEAS that have as their explicit task not just to 
‘manage’ these relationships, but to prepare and conduct an active structural diplomacy.  
 
Second, we would propose that that the EU should only promote structures, values and 
approaches after considering seriously, firstly, what these structures can mean within the 
context of the third country or region and, secondly, how they can be adapted to the specific 
context and distinctive priorities and interests of the partner country. This also implies that 
the EU has to start considering dialogue as a real two-way process in which dialogue is an 
essential tool to learn more about the contexts and real priorities of the partner countries.  
 
Our third proposal is that the EU has to ensure that the new EEAS will have enough 
expertise about the other parts of the world. Whereas the current concern seems to be 
whether the EEAS contains a sufficient number and appropriate balance of staff from the 
member states, Council secretariat and Commission, the main concern should become 
whether it contains a sufficient number of top experts on China, Asia, Islamism, the Arab 
world, etc., as a prerequisite for developing a structural diplomacy that is relevant and 
effective in a changing international context. 
 
 
Concluding Recommendations 
 
Our key general recommendation is that the debate on the emerging EU system of 
diplomacy should lift its eyes from the tactical debates in Brussels or between Brussels and 
national capitals, and take into account the broader context set out in this paper. In pursuit of 
that more general recommendation, we make four overall recommendations on the basis of 
the argument set out here: 
 
 First, that the debate should take more explicitly into account the changing nature 
both of diplomacy in general and of the more specific diplomatic constellation in the 
contemporary world arena, and should identify the ways in which an EU diplomacy 
might meet those challenges. 
 
 Second, that the debate should make a far more explicit link between the contested 
institutional frameworks and allocations of responsibility and the aims that an EU 
diplomacy might pursue – many of which are extant but largely ignored in the tactical 
battles being fought in Brussels. 
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 Third, that a key consideration in evaluating the capacity of the emerging EU system 
of diplomacy should be its capacity to undertake, sustain and bring to fruition a 
coherent EU strategic diplomacy. 
 
 Finally, that the debate should take fully into account the need to build on successes 
in EU structural diplomacy, and to avoid outcomes that would limit or eliminate the 
potential for a creative EU structural diplomacy. 
 
We do not see these as issues that can be postponed until after the debate has been 
concluded – we see them as vital props to a successful EU diplomacy for the future.  
 
March 2010 
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